Introduction
The history of banking system in Europe has always been the domain of economic historians. In Russia, two academic schools have kept leading positions in the study of banks: the Moscow school of Valery Bovykin, and the St. Petersburg school of Boris Ananich. Bovykin, Ananich, and their disciples authored the most important books on the history of state credit institutions (before the emancipation of 1861), private banks, and the State Bank. 4 These works focus mostly on the analysis of the commercial operations of banks and their clienteles. They aim to uncover the role of bank capital in Russia's industrialization, and answers the question of who had «sponsored» its industrial development -the state, domestic, or foreign capital. Another aspect of this analysis is the interpenetration of financial and industrial capital, and the government policy toward banks and the financial sector of economy, namely, the policy of the Ministry of Finances, being usually reduced to the realization of the «program of economic development» of one minister or another.
Traditional historiographical focus on Russia's industrialization basically reduces the chronology of analysis to the period of the 1893-1899, and to the early twentieth century when, according to Paul Gregory, the Russian Empire entered the period of «modern growth» (Simon Kuznetz's term). 5 The 1890s witnessed the increase in the investment activity of banks that often organized the emission of private companies' stocks. The share of state, guaranteed by the state bonds, and mortgages in the structure of stock market fell, while the share of privately issued bonds increased dramatically. 6 Thus, the historiographical trend that prioritizes the last decade of the nineteenth century over the earlier period seems to be well justified, all the more so because of the immense growth of documentary sources, including statistics, available for this period.
However, the interest in the 1890s overshadows the importance of the earlier period, when the ground for the «take-off» was prepared.
Historians usually agree that in the period of 1860s through the 1880s Russian state actively participated in the definition of the «rules of the game» on financial market, therefore governing economy both directly (via credit and financial policy) and indirectly. These conclusions seem to confirm Alexander Gerschenkron's famous concept of «catching-up industrialization». According to Gerschenkron, in Russia the government «substituted» private 4 Bibliography of studies of the both schools is too extensive to be cited here. capital that had played the leading role in British industrialization, the ideal model for economic historians, or investment banks, that played this role on the continent. 7 In the last fifty years, Gerschenkron's concept have been repeatedly questioned and criticized, 8 with the result that merely recalling it now may appear as an anachronism. However, it seems that problems, which
Gerschenkron had raised, in the great part remained unresolved, and it is possible and necessary to address them using new empirical data and methodology.
Did the Russian state really play exclusive role in the creation and maintenance of the institutional infrastructure, which defined economic growth, and the growth of the banking system, specifically? Was this special role of the state a result of conscious choice and the deliberate planning of Russia's government officials, or, may be it evolved spontaneously, adhoc, in the process of situational decision-making? What ideology stood behind these processes?
To answer these questions, one may address the documents of government agencies that reflect day-to-day regulatory activity: the revision of banks' statutes, approval of loans and credits, the regulation of join-stock operations and financial market. It is no less important, however, to analyze public opinion and study ideas that circulated in society and the elite circles, which, as it may seem, had no direct relation to finances but reflected the attitude to the regulatory role of the state. The problems of financial history and banking have been often considered as isolated from political and ideological context. An important component to this context was the «economic science» (political economy and financial law), which in the second part of the nineteenth century acquired the status of applied «expert knowledge».
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Studying the trends of economic development normally requires a different optics, and a longer chronological perspective than the analysis of situational political conjuncture. compliment it with the analysis of ideas and representations. I will try to show to what extent the main financial reforms of the 1860s and the 1890s had been defined by the images of «ideal» economic development -in public imagination as well as in expert opinion.
The first State Bank's Charter, 1860
The State Bank came to life at a unique moment, when Russian educated society suddenly «opened» for itself economy and the economic question. Banks and financial market, as well as the theories of political economy that explained to philistines the basic elements of these institutions became the key symbols of the new era of the Great Reforms after the end of the Crimean War. 11 It is necessary to stress that in Western Europe, such topics as the fictitious nature of money, the opposition between joint-stock speculations and production (especially traditional, agrarian production) had already become the issue of debates and reflections for writers and journalists as early as in the eighteenth century. 12 In the first half of the 19th century political economy outgrew the straight jacket of academic discipline, while its method and language came to be used for the description of various problems: political, social, and personal. 13 At the same time, various social utopias began to flourish, and it was the language of political economy that shaped the utopian discourses.
Russian educated elite in the first half of the nineteenth century, before the beginning of the Great Reforms, closely followed the development of these discourses in Europe. In the reputation of a learned economist, 15 but the principles of his policy might have appeared, by the European standards of the 1830s-1840s, quite archaic. An ardent opponent of railways and jointstock banks -two basic symbols of the new industrial life on the continent, the ardent proponent of the policy of «freezing» national economy, Kankrin was a conservative homme d'état par excellence. 16 He was perceived as an embodiment of monumental, but, as it turned down, very vulnerable and not capable for development kazennaia (state) credit system. The state «credit institutions» used high interest rates to accumulate huge amounts of money on their accounts, but had neither incentives nor the possibility to use these funds productively. This money was spent on financing treasury's operations, or the mortgages for landowners. As a result, the state debt increased rapidly; its size was a matter of state secret, and the system of state credit institutions was so opaque, that even the government had no precise information about its own indebtedness. 17 Official «academic» works avoided discussing the question of state finances, while foreign observers put a lot of efforts in guessing the real state of affairs.
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But the main problem of the pre-reform credit system was that, administrative centralization notwithstanding, its various parts existed fairly independently of each other. This autonomy was not a result of a deliberate choice (in theory, the government may have tried to stir competition among its agencies), but, in opposite, the outcome of the state's institutional weakness. Nevertheless, the state held the monopoly on banking and credit activity. Commercial credit represented a very small share of state credit operations.
Not surprisingly, as the result of the Crimean war of 1853-1856, this seemingly stable system began to fail. Russian economy turned out to be inflated with money, since the war, naturally, had been financed through emission. 19 In 1857 the total amount of deposits in banks exceeded one trillion rubles; government expenses on the payment of interests to depositors, as well as the budget deficit, skyrocketed. Then the Ministry of Finances decided to decrease interest rate from 4 to 3 percent. At the same time, it encouraged the creation of dozens of private joint-stock companies. It hoped that money would flow from deposits to the stock exchange and industry (especially into railway building, which became one of the state's priorities). 20 As a result, in 1857-58 Russia experienced its first stockjobbing. Shares and bonds were in high demand, share prices grew in the expectation of unbelievably high profits; depositors withdrew from the state credit institutions more that one and a half hundred million rubles.
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Russian society for the first time faced the new reality, which it had previously seen only from distance, observing the financial life of Europe, and by the time when its signs just began to appear, the models for their analysis had been already in place. With awe and exultation, the writers of the late 1850s remarked that Russia was no better (or worse) than France, where financial speculations and agiotage had been driving mad not only financiers, but also simple men of the street.
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The outcome of the joint-stock bubble was predictably negative. Instead of attracting domestic and foreign investments, it finally caused significant flight of capital from the country.
Financial market collapsed, while state credit system run out of liquidity, and the government faced the danger of default. 23 On this background, the first Charter of the State Bank was being prepared. Its preparation was carried out behind-the-scenes, in a hurry. Remarkably, and very untypically for the bureaucratic practice of that time, it has left very few materials. In fact, the however, the amount of money in circulation was defined by the needs of treasury, rather than economic conditions. On the other hand, the reformers were well aware of the fact that the development of credit system in Russia significantly fell behind its European counterparts (for instance, the first joint-stock bank appeared in Russia only in 1864). They also knew that in Russia technologies of banking and credit were also backward by European standards. For instance, promissory notes that were a common means of short-term credit and payment in Great Britain or France, were by far not so widespread in Russia.
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In this situation, the financial reform was supposed to 1) provide the transparency of budget and non-budget financial currents (if not for society, then at least for the government), and the settling the state debts, 2) introduce market principles into the credit system (and dismantle the archaic state credit institutions), 3) to normalize currency system. The latter part of the plan was particularly important, though historians have largely ignored it. It is usually believed that at this point, the reformers simply tried to restore free exchange of paper money to silver, that had been suspended with the Crimean War, that is to say, to restore the «Kankrin system». In fact, the authors of the reform of 1860 were very much critical of Kankrin heritage, as they saw the "normal" mechanisms of currency exchange very differently. According to the concept of the British «banking school», which they tried to adapt to Russian conditions, as long as a bank accept as security only reliable short-term promissory notes based on real trade transactions, inflation is not possible (it was the so called real bills doctrine and businessman close to the government, the same people were sitting in the offices of both institutions, while servants carried big sacks with money from one cash desk to another, depending on the needs of either bank. 27 Needless to say, such practice would be unthinkable in an independent joint-stock bank.
State Bank's Charter of 1894
The pace of economic development of the reforms-era Russia (1860s-1870s) was much less intensive than in Europe and the US, where the so-called «concessional» order of the joint- Reutern might have realized the deficiencies of his policy that seriously restricted the freedom of entrepreneurship, but he did not see an alternative to it. One of the consequences of this policy was the transformation of the State Bank, which, while nominally still performing the functions of short-term commercial credit institution, evolved into the instrument of direct regulation of economy. It assumed that state officials interpreted the role of the state in the credit sphere more extensively than before. According to the future minister of finance (1881-1886) Nikolay Bunge, «while not getting rid completely of private banking, the state must maintain the government's preponderant role in the sphere of credit, to regulate credit and make it less expensive, and, finally, to direct it in spheres which do not appear especially attractive for private entrepreneurs». 29 This declaration reflects the vision of state regulation activity that became dominant in the late 1870s and the 1880s. The problem for authorities was how to define the limits of state involvement, and what to consider being the priorities for its application -for instance, industry or agriculture?
In the late 1880s -early 1890s the opinions of where to direct the flows of money, changed dramatically. In that time, experts close to the government often declared that the State Bank must limit its support to private banks, since the latter use these state funds for «financial speculations». 30 Therefore, they suggested restricting precisely that sort of activity, which had allowed the State Bank to develop in a direction of «modern» central bank. Instead of supporting private credit institutions, it now must have rendered support to small, especially rural producers.
These ideas were to a great extent inspired by populist ideology that spread in Russian society from the late 1870s. The main object of anxiety for both left and right wing economists, politicians and journalists became the allegedly «impoverishing» Russian village. The rights insisted on rendering support to landlords along with peasants; the lefts suggested limiting the government's support only to peasantry. Both lamented that the small rural producers had been trapped by moneylenders, or local «kulaks». 31 In the imagination of many Russian nationalists, the figure of «kulak» (often, a Jewish moneylender) turned out to be a local analogous to the figure of a big banker (also, often Jewish), who was accused of «parasitizing» Russia's economy on a national scale. The "parasites-financiers" were perceived as direct opposite to "producers".
Thus production and credit were regarded not as the two symbiotic forms of economic life, but rather as the antagonistic activities and even worldviews, that had very distinctive national connotations.
In At the same time, materials of the discussion make it clear that most of the experts were well aware of the fact Antonovich's ideas were very controversial and hardly applicable. The professor believed in the benefits of inflation policy 32 ; he thought that paper money should be backed up not by gold or silver reserves, or credit operations, but by certain "product valuables", manufactured with the help of these money, for instance -railroads. Similarly, credit had to rest not on liquid assets, but on values that had been created by the same credit 33 . This financial perpetuum mobile allowed Witte to "find" simple way to resolve the problem of investments:
issuing paper money was supposed to create values that would allow new emissions, and so on and so forth. As Olga Dragan has aptly observed, Antonovich and Witte were guided by non-economic logic: "Not the changes in economy made the reform of the Bank necessary, but rather the Bank had to be reformed in order to stimulate changes in economy". 36 The State Bank was supposed to become the main instrument of building the "Russia's special economy", in which small and middle producers enjoyed more privileges than the large ones. Witte just tried to respond to the "political demand" from above and use the support of conservative forces in government and in society.
He managed to pull the project through the stages of the legislative process. However, the new Charter never started to act in reality. The death of Alexander III that followed soon after its During thirty years following the beginning of the Great Reforms, the mainstream ideas of Russian economists changed radically. The idealization of "free market" yielded to protectionism and statism. However, in both instances the "scientifically"-based program of actions, when faced economic reality, mutated and turned almost into its opposite. Academic experts played the key role in these transformations: they turned out to be very flexible and responsive to ideological pressure and technological fantasies. Science and authority merged not for the scientific substantiation of governmental policy, but for the production of weird marketbureaucratic hybrids.
